Bishops’ of the European Union Concerned Over EU Judgement on Same-Sex Marriage saying "based on natural law...marriage...a union between a man and a woman”
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Statement by the Presidency of COMECE
on the recent European Court of Justice judgment
concerning the recognition of same-sex marriages between
Member States
The Presidium of the Commission of the Episcopates of the European Union
(COMECE), gathered on 3 December 2025, analysed and discussed the recent
judgment issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case Wojewoda
Mazowiecki, C-713/23.
The considerations we express in the present Statement are rooted in the Church’s
anthropological view, based on natural law, of marriage as a union between a man
and a woman.
While fully respecting the role of the EU judiciary, we feel compelled to comment on
some aspects of the ruling, noting with concern its impact upon questions that are at
the core of national competences. For a number of years, the COMECE Legal Affairs
Commission has been carrying out reflections on the matter of family law with crossborder implications, constantly stressing the importance of a prudent and cautious
approach and of avoiding undue influences on national legal systems.
The judgment declares that a Member State has the obligation to recognise a marriage
between two Union citizens of the same sex that has been lawfully concluded in
another Member State, where they have exercised their freedom to move and reside.
The EU Court had already made advances in this area, notably with the Coman, C673/16 judgment. However, the ruling issued on 25 November 2025 appears to push
jurisprudence beyond the boundaries of EU competences.
Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (‘Right to marry and right to
found a family’) states that “The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be
guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights”.
Marriage is defined as a union between a man and a woman in the legal systems of
various EU Member States, including, in some cases, by means of Constitutional
provisions.
The EU Court indeed acknowledges that the obligation affirmed in its ruling “…does
not undermine the institution of marriage in the Member State of origin, which is defined by
national law” and states that “…as EU law currently stands, the rules on marriage come
EN IT FR DE ES SK PL HU
STATEMENT
09.12.2025
within the competence of the Member States, and EU law cannot detract from that competence.
The Member States are thus free to decide whether or not to allow marriage for persons of the
same sex under their national law”. However, the EU Court strictly narrows down the
significance of such affirmation by underlining that in exercising this competence,
each Member State must comply with EU law, in particular the provisions of the
Treaties on the freedom of EU citizens to move and reside within the territory of the
Member States.
We note with worry the trend to apply provisions that should protect sensitive
components of national legal systems in a way that impoverishes their meaning. It is
the case, with this ruling, with regard to Article 9 of the EU Charter. In the recent past,
the same worrying tendency emerged with other, distinct key EU provisions, such as
Article 17(1) TFEU on the protection of the status of Churches and religious
associations or communities under Member States law.
Bearing in mind the importance of acknowledging the richness and diversity of the
EU juridical panorama and traditions, we also note the disappointingly limited role
attributed by the Court to the respect for Member States’ ‘national identities’ (Article
4.2 TEU) and to their public policy/ordre publique. For some Member States, the
definition of marriage forms part of their national identity.
The EU Court ruling will have an impact on national family law legal systems and
may foster pressure to amend them. It also requires the introduction of recognition
procedures and even calls for the disapplication, if need be, of the national provisions
concerned. The ruling effectively creates a convergence of matrimonial-law effects,
even though the Union does not have a mandate to harmonise family law. There is
also an impact on legal certainty, as increasingly Member States will not be able to
foresee in a clear manner which parts of their family law will remain within their
autonomy.
Furthermore, COMECE is concerned that the judgment may lead to negative
developments in other sensitive areas for cross-border family law, for instance paving
the way to future similar legal approaches regarding surrogacy.
Finally, recalling the challenging context the European Union is currently facing - also
in reference to its perception in various countries - it comes as no surprise that these
kinds of judgments give rise to anti-European sentiments in Member States and can
be easily instrumentalised in this sense.
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